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Decentralization and basic services provision: water and sanitation in Ghana
Summary
How does decentralization reform affect the provision of basic services, particularly 
water and sanitation in Ghana? We deal in particular the delivery of water and sanitation, 
given the importance of water and sanitation. Conclusions are drawn concerning the 
policy implications for the design and implementation of decentralization reform. The 
first is the need to ensure that laws establishing service delivery agencies and possible 
partnership arrangements are consistent with the specific laws that set out the nature of 
decentralization reform. The second policy implication of our study is the need for a 
conscious implementation plan in support of decentralization laws and policies. The third 
policy implication regards the question of appropriate roles by local government. We 
have observed that pluralism performs better that distributed monopoly by public utilities. 
Decentralization reforms should deepen local accountability in the provision of basic 
services. Finally, assigning leadership, brokerage and oversight roles to local government 
in the design of decentralization reforms is critical for expanding basic services.
Key words: decentralization, service delivery, water and sanitation, performance, Ghana
Africa
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Decentralization and basic services provision: water and sanitation in Ghana
Introduction
This paper analyses how decentralization reform affects the provision of basic services, 
particularly water and sanitation in Ghana. The paper reviews differences in types of 
decentralization that have emerged since the most recent wave of reforms in 1988 and the 
influence these have had on service delivery. The paper is divided in different parts. The 
first part summarizes the conceptual discussion of decentralization, particularly, with 
regard to the provision of basic services. The second part of the paper focuses on the 
extent to which decentralization and related reforms in Ghana have influenced the 
delivery of water and sanitation. The third part discusses how the various types of 
decentralization that have emerged in the delivery of water and sanitation after the 
introduction of the reform are performing. We conclude the paper with some lessons for 
policy. 
We use water and sanitation as examples of basic services because of prevailing 
institutional and financial constraints in their provision in the country and the importance 
of these (water and sanitation) in the discussion on achieving the Millennium 
Development Goals in Africa. In 2002, 70% of urban and 46% of rural dwellers in Ghana 
were covered by safe water supply; and, 45% of urban and 20% of rural dwellers used 
safe excreta disposal methods (Republic of Ghana, 2002). To meet the United Nations 
endorsed Millennium Development Goals on water and sanitation, Ghana needs to 
radically reform service delivery agencies and in addition spend about $1.6 billion 
towards supplying 85% urban population and 80% rural population with safe water by 
2015; and $1.1 billion towards providing 84% of urban population and 76% of rural 
population with adequate sanitation by 2020 (Ministry of Works and Housing, 2004).
Some conceptual discussions
The literature is unanimous about the importance of decentralization. This is because it 
affects every policy decision - from maintaining macroeconomic stability and the 
development of the financial sector to the effectiveness and efficiency of the delivery of 
basic services (Litvack and Seddon, 1999). 
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The works of Cheema, Nellis, Rondinelli and Silverman in the 1980s and 1990s provide 
direction in the definition of decentralization1.  For most part, there is consensus on the 
key elements. These are transfer of authority (that is power, by law) for (specified) public 
functions; transfer of responsibility (that is roles and tasks) for public functions; transfer 
of resources; and transfer is from a higher level of government to a lower level or from a 
level of government to a quasi-independent government organisation (Rondinelli, 1999).
Cohen and Peterson (1997) and Bossert and Beauvais (2002) emphasise the need to look 
beyond the public sector in the transfer of such responsibility and resources. 
The classification of decentralization by forms and types by the Cheema-Nellis-
Rondinelli-Silverman school is particularly relevant. By this approach, decentralization is 
classified by forms on the basis of objectives, the three main forms being: political, fiscal
and administrative decentralization2. 
Political decentralization aims to give citizens and their elected representatives more 
power in public decision-making. It is about pluralistic politics and representative 
government, particularly at the local level. It is also about democratisation - giving 
citizens or their representatives more influence in formulating and implementing policies
(Rondinelli, 1999). Political decentralization often requires constitutional or statutory 
reforms; strengthening of legislatures; creation of local political units; encouragement of 
effective public interest groups; and, development of pluralistic political parties.
Advocates of political decentralization assume that decisions made with greater 
participation will be better for the effectiveness and efficiency of service delivery (Ayee, 
1997). 
 
Financial responsibility is a core component of decentralization. If local governments and 
private organisations are to carry out decentralised functions effectively; they must have 
adequate revenues – raised locally or transferred from the central government – as well as 
the authority to make expenditure decisions. Bahl and Linn (1992) and World Bank 
(2002) discuss fiscal decentralization as including: (a) self-financing or cost recovery 
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through user charges; (b) co-financing or co production, in which users participate in 
providing services and infrastructure through monetary or labour contributions; (c) 
expansion of local revenues through property, sales or other local taxes or indirect 
charges (for example, betterment taxes); (d) intergovernmental transfers of general 
revenues from taxes collected by the central government to local governments for general 
or specific uses; (e) authorisation of municipal borrowing and mobilisation of resources, 
including loan guarantees by central government.
Administrative decentralization, according to Cohen and Peterson (1997), seeks to 
redistribute authority and responsibility for providing public services among different 
levels of government. It is the transfer of responsibility for specified public functions 
from the central government and its agencies to field units of government agencies, 
subordinate units or levels of government, semi-autonomous public authorities or 
corporations, or area-wide, regional, or functional authorities (World Bank, 2000). 
Administrative decentralization usually means the transfer of the following 
responsibilities: planning, budgeting, staffing, program and project implementation, 
information management and operation and maintenance from a higher to lower level of 
government or from government to a quasi government or private sector organisation.
According to Cohen and Peterson (1999), different combinations of the forms of 
decentralization result in types (of decentralization). The literature generally discusses
three main types emerging as a result of the combination of forms. These are 
deconcentration, delegation and devolution (Cheema and Rondinelli 1983). 
Deconcentration, the weakest type of decentralization, is the redistribution of functions to 
non central government levels within sector ministries or other sector-specific national 
agencies (Rondinelli, Nellis and Cheema, 1984). Despite geographical dispersion of 
ministry offices and central government employees stationed in branch offices, 
deconcentration centralises power within central government organisations (World Bank, 
1993). Delegation is more extensive, involving the transfer of responsibility for decision-
making and administration of public functions to semi-autonomous organisations not 
wholly controlled by the government, but ultimately accountable to it (for example 
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special purpose local government units, state owned enterprises and enclave projects).
Devolution is even more extensive and involves the transfer of authority for decision-
making, finance and management to quasi-autonomous units of local government with 
corporate status. The essence of devolution is discretionary authority. Variants of types, 
such as the principal agency model (arguably a variant of delegation) can be observed in 
practice (Bossert and Beauvais, 2002).
Another school, dominated by Cohen and Peterson (1997; 1999) analyse decentralization
more from the perspective of roles distribution. They postulate the existence of three 
states: 
a) Institutional Monopoly, or centralisation, where roles are concentrated at the spatial 
centre in an organisation or institution
b) Distributed Institutional Monopoly, or decentralization to local level governmental 
institutions or private sector firms and organisation through deconcentration, 
devolution, and/or delegation, but where roles are distributed spatially and 
concentrated in one organisation or institution
c) Institutional pluralism, or decentralization through deconcentration, devolution, 
and/or delegation, but where roles are shared by two or more organisations or 
institutions, which can be at the spatial centre, distributed, or a combination of both.
Strong in Cohen and Peterson’s frame is the notion of pluralism, that is, the distribution 
of roles among various actors at various levels of service provision. Pluralism can be 
planned for through conscious sequencing of reforms. Figure 1 depicts Cohen and 
Peterson’s classification of the different states of decentralization and distribution of 
roles. Description of each quadrant is as follows: 
i. Quadrant I represents centralisation or institutional monopoly, where roles are not 
shared, but instead are monopolised within one central public institution.
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ii. Quadrant III represents distributed institutional monopoly, where roles are not 
shared, but responsibility for roles is spatially distributed. Included in this 
quadrant are the deconcentrated and devolved types of decentralization.
iii. Quadrants II and IV represent institutional pluralism, where roles related to a 
specific task are shared by two or more governmental institutions and/or private 
sector firms or community organisations. Institutional pluralism can be spatially 
centralised as in Quadrant II or decentralised as in Quadrant IV.
Figure 1: Theoretical states of decentralization and distribution of roles
Helmsing (2000) and Awortwi (2004) add to the discussion on pluralism by emphasising 
the importance of a multi-actor framework. The need for such a framework is due to: (a) 
rethinking of which institutions are best suited to identify demand; (b) the reality of 
government failure, market failure, technological changes, and organisational and 
managerial innovations that permit unbundling of services; (c) demands by organised 
groups in society and of citizens in general to participate in the public decision making; 
(d) appreciation of indigenous institutions through which communities organise basic 
services; and, (e) the increasing strength of the NGO/CBO non-profit sector in strength in 
the delivery of basic services; (f) limitations of the of the new public management 
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approaches in addressing only issues of efficiency (such as by greater involvement of the 
private sector in service provision)3 and not the wider dimensions of local governance.
In this paper, we draw from these three perspectives of structure/space (Rondinelli et al., 
1984), roles (Cohen et al., 1999), and multi-actor (Helmsing, 2000), to ascertain the 
dimensions of water and sanitation in Ghana. We note that in spite of differences in 
emphasis, there is consensus on some issues for analysis, particularly in ascertaining the 
form that decentralization takes as well as the emerging types; examination of clarity in 
the definition and distribution of roles in service delivery, and determining evidence of 
sequencing towards a given strategy; and whether a given type of decentralization has the 
potential to yield better results. 
Data sources
We collected data from three sources: (a) official records of public sector agencies, firms 
and civil society managers of basic services delivery; (b) interviews with public sector, 
firms and civil society managers of basic service delivery; (c) a household survey in two 
districts in the northern part of Ghana, Tamale and Savelugu-Nanton4 (see Map 1) that 
represent the two approaches to the delivery of water in Ghana. Tamale is a one town 
district. Provision of water in Tamale is by a public utility, the Ghana Water Company 
Limited. Provision of sanitation in Tamale is by local government. Savelugu-Nanton on 
the other hand is a semi-urban district (has five towns and rural areas). Provision of water 
is a joint responsibility of local government and the Community Water and Sanitation 
Agency (a central government technical support and fund mobilising agency). Provision 
of sanitation is by local government. We interviewed a sample of 766 households from 
the two districts, 402 from Tamale and 364 from Savelugu-Nanton5. The characteristics 
of the sample are summarised in Annex 1.
Map 1: Ghana and the two study districts
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Analysis
Our analytical framework, how decentralization influences the delivery of basic services,
is derived from the logic model of inputs-immediate effects-outputs-outcomes6. The main 
elements of our framework are that: (a) underlying legislation and subsequent policies 
serve as inputs; (b) the emerging type of decentralization and distribution of roles are the
immediate effects; (c) the emerging institutional approaches to service delivery 
(monopoly, distributed monopoly, pluralism) at the decentralised level of governance are 
the outputs; and, (d) the effects on performance in the delivery of services serve are
outcomes. 
Analytical Framework
(i) Underlying legislation and subsequent policies
Ghana has experimented with various forms and types of decentralization since its 
colonisation by the British. However, the current forms and types are very much the 
result of the most recent decentralization reform, which started in 1988. In 1988, the 
Savelugu-Nanton
Tamale
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Government embarked on the implementation of a new policy to decentralise the system 
of Government with the enactment of the Local Government Law, 1988 (PNDC Law 
207) and later, through its revised version Local Government Act of 1993, Act 463.  The 
thrust of the law was to devolve power and resources to the district level and to promote 
popular participation in governance (Ayee, 1997). Furthermore, the main features of the 
decentralization policy were enshrined in the 1992 Constitution of Ghana. Provisions of 
the Constitution suggest a framework almost akin to devolution of decision-making 
responsibilities to District Assemblies, “for all matters regarding people of their districts” 
(Republic of Ghana, 1992). The Constitution establishes a framework for local control 
over human and financial resources that are necessary for development at that level. An 
apparent exception is in political decentralization where central control is exercised in the 
appointment of the mayor and a third of councillors (MLGRD, 1996; MLGRD, 1999; 
MLGRD, 2002). 
Pursuing the decentralization reform in terms of what it means for the existing water and 
sanitation delivery agencies has however been a slow and somewhat confusing exercise 
(Laryea-Adjei, 2006). The Government of Ghana embarked on restructuring the water 
and sanitation sector in the 1990s (after the most recent decentralization reform started). 
The approach was to separate management of piped water in cities from those in small 
towns and rural districts. Management of sanitation was also separated from urban water 
provision and placed under local governments (District Assemblies) and a central 
government agency, the Community Water and Sanitation Agency (CWSA) (Yakubu, 
2003). 
Provision of safe water in urban areas is the main task of the Ghana Water Company 
Limited (GWCL), a public utility. The GWCL is currently being restructured as an 
autonomous private limited liability company under a management contract (by a private 
firm). The country’s Public Utilities Regulatory Commission (PURC) has a regulatory 
role, particularly with regard to tariff setting (Ministry of Works and Housing, 2004). 
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The Community Water and Sanitation Agency (CWSA) was established by Act 564 of 
1998, out of the then Ghana Water and Sewerage Corporation, the nucleus of which 
remains today as the Ghana Water Company Limited (CWSA, 2004). It oversees the 
provision of water in small towns, semi-urban and rural districts. The CWSA policy on 
water provision, unlike that of the GWCL, reflects elements of the country’s 
decentralization reform. The policy emphasises a central role by local governments and 
communities in planning and management. The CWSA mobilises funds for investment 
some varying degrees of local co-financing (generally not significant), and also provides 
technical assistance to local governments for both provision of water, hygiene education 
and introduction of new sanitation technologies (Yakubu, 2003). 
The 1999 “Environmental Sanitation Policy” of government emphasises the role of local 
governments in planning and managing sanitation services. However, the policy 
acknowledges the need for further work on how to harmonise the activities of various 
central government agencies in involved in sanitation management with those of local 
governments (MLGRD, 1999).
Type of decentralization and institutional strategy for service provision
As stated earlier, our chief concern, in this paper, is the extent to which the devolution 
objective of the country’s Constitution is reflected in reforms in the provision of water 
and sanitation in districts. On the basis of primary data, we develop and apply a set of
indicators for assessing the main forms of decentralization (political, administrative and 
fiscal decentralization) as well as indicators of the concentration/distribution of roles in 
service delivery (indicators of roles distribution and partnerships7). Our choice of 
indicators is guided by three considerations: (a) lessons concerning the choice of 
indicators from the general literature8; (b) interest in progress on the ground and just not 
accept what is stated in policy documents; (c) going beyond legal or civil service 
traditions that are common to all districts in the country. For example, under political 
decentralization, we do not use the “election/appointment of the mayor/councillors” as an 
indicator because this applies to all districts in country; instead we use indicator of 
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“participation of consumers and civic associations in various levels/stages of service 
delivery”. Our indicators are summarised in Table.1.
Table 1: Assessing decentralization and institutional strategy
Feature Indicators
Political • Involvement of consumers in stages of service delivery
• Involvement of civic associations in stages of service delivery
Administrative
decentralization, 
Role distribution 
      & 
• Responsibility for hiring, firing and wages over staff
• Clarity of responsibilities
• Local responsibility for planning, O&M
• Responsibility for regulatory framework
Partnerships • Responsibility for managing partnerships
• Responsibilities devolved to partner
• Capacity to manage partnerships
• Co-financing arrangement
Fiscal • Local expenditure on sector financed and earmarked by central transfers
• Local expenditure on sector financed by central but controlled by district
• Local investment on sector financed from local revenues
• Share of revenue in sector raised and retained by district
Overall, we find that the immediate effects of legislation and policies are service delivery 
systems that are more decentralised and plural in Savelugu-Nanton than in Tamale. This 
is particularly so for water, where GWCL has a deconcentrated approach to service 
delivery and has no partnership arrangement with local government, the Tamale 
Municipal Assembly (TMA); and where the TMA has also not initiated any partnership 
arrangement with the GWCL to improve the delivery of water. Regarding sanitation, both 
Savelugu-Nanton and Tamale have similar approaches to the delivery of sanitation, 
which can be described as moving towards greater decentralization, but with 
responsibilities for staffing and in a partial way, funding, managed from above. We also 
ascertain that pluralism is beginning to emerge in the provision of sanitation in Savelugu-
Nanton more than in Tamale. Tamale has roles for service provision largely concentrated 
in the government structure.
In terms of outputs, our analysis shows that the provision of water and sanitation in 
Savelugu-Nanton is through delegation and pluralism at the decentralized level of 
government. Roles are shared by more than one governmental institution, NGOs, private 
sector firms and community organizations. Roles are also spatially decentralised. Plural 
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arrangements in Savelugu-Nanton have brought opportunities for service delivery - in the 
form of skills and resources from other actors who are not controlled by government. 
In Tamale, water provision is through a combination of distributed monopoly and
deconcentration. Roles are concentrated in the structure of the GWCL, but spatially 
distributed from its headquarters in Accra to Tamale. Provision of sanitation in Tamale is 
through delegation and distributed monopoly within the government structure, with signs 
of a transition to pluralism (mainly through contracting out management of one third of 
the public sanitation facilities). 
After applying our analytical framework, we demonstrate in Figure 2 how 
decentralization and pluralism have emerged in the two study districts in the provision of 
water and sanitation, including the evolution path that they have followed.
Figure 2: Evolution of decentralization in the two districts
Provision of water in Tamale:
Provision of sanitation in Tamale:
Provision of water in Savelugu-Nanton:
Provision of sanitation in Savelugu-Nanton:
We further note that extremely limited fiscal decentralization as well as control of local 
government staff by the centre are disincentives for devolution in the two districts. We 
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therefore observe that the design and implementation of reforms have led to a hybrid of 
types of decentralization for the provision of each service and a more intricate hybrid for 
a combination of services. Furthermore, the existence of pluralism differs in each of the 
two districts, even for the same service. 
Reasons for differences in decentralization in the two districts
We assessed reasons for differences in types of decentralization and distribution of roles
through key informant’s interview, mainly involving managers of water and sanitation 
services at all levels of governance. The key informants’ interview provided an 
opportunity to discuss the role that legislation, national policy and other factors play in 
determining the type of decentralization and distribution of roles in service delivery. The 
first reason provided is that the two main public agencies for delivery of water have 
different approaches, with CWSA seeking a role for local government in service delivery, 
and the GWCL operating in a deconcentrated manner. Tamale falls under the more 
centralised GWCL system and Savelugu-Nanton, the more decentralised CWSA system. 
The inference is that policies for delivery of basic services have all not been revised to 
support the objective of decentralization. Provision of water in towns like Tamale is in 
the hands of GWCL the public utility, which does not involve local governments in 
service delivery. Provision of water in smaller towns and semi-urban districts like 
Savelugu-Nanton have both local government and the CWSA sharing the leadership role 
for service provision, a feature that is more in line with the decentralization policy. 
The second reason given by key informants for the differences in decentralization is the 
role that local governments choose to play in the delivery of services, that is, the ability to 
take advantages of decentralization reform to play more active roles in service provision. 
As we can see in the case of water provision in Table 2, local government in Savelugu-
Nanton (SNDA) plays an active role in most of the key roles in service provision, unlike 
the case of the Tamale Municipal Assembly. Provision of water in Tamale is largely 
concentrated in the GWCL structure. The TMA plays a more active role in the provision 
of sanitation though less than that of the SNDA. Key informants and municipal records 
indicate that the Savelugu-Nanton District Assembly (SNDA) commenced promoting 
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plural arrangements for the provision of basic services before the CWSA approach took 
shape in the district. Key informants attributed this to: (a) the deep poverty in the district
which called for more local action; (b) high prevalence of diseases which called for 
partnerships; (c) donor interest in the district because of the extent of poverty; and, (d) the 
newness of the district9, which stimulated a high expectation of local government among 
citizens. The SNDA, with the support of its partners, has subsequently enhanced its 
leadership and brokerage roles in the provision of water and sanitation services. This is 
demonstrated by its ability to organise and lead participatory planning and monitoring 
meetings, pool skills from NGOs and the private sector for specific tasks and mobilise 
financial resources from a wide range of actors for service provision. We found out that 
staff of the SNDA have a posture of expediting the work of other agencies (state and non-
state) involved in direct service provision. Leadership and brokerage roles are much less 
evident in the TMA. 
Table 2: Distribution of roles in provision of water
SNDA TMA GWCL CWSA MWH PURC Non state 
partners in 
SNDA*
Non state 
partners in 
TMA*
Leadership x x x
Policy 
formulation
x
Planning x x x x
Budgeting x x x x
Financing x x Extremely 
limited role
Operation & 
Maintenance
x x x Extremely 
limited role
Brokerage x x
Oversight x x x
Regulation x x x
* That is, where they play a significant role
Sources: Government records and authors’ key informants’ and focus group discussions
The third reason mentioned for the current type of decentralisation is the roles that 
external partners play in service provision. International development partners have in 
particular been attracted to provide long-term assistance in Savelugu-Nanton because of 
its more plural arrangements, that is, in addition to their concerns about poverty levels. 
Development partners support the leadership and brokerage roles of the SNDA through 
training, development of tools and on a lesser basis, use of consultants. Support is both 
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demand-driven as well donor-driven. Development partners usually insist on changes in 
management practices viewed as negative to their investment in the district. Despite their 
role, interviews with development partners indicate that Savelugu-Nanton has been more 
proactive in seeking support, and for specific tasks, than Tamale. The SNDA, for 
example, has a practice of requesting their partners to provide their response to the 
district problems during participatory planning meetings. District staff visit donors to 
learn of their programs and to seek support. The TMA has no such practice. Participatory 
planning and monitoring appears to have improved transparency in decision-making and 
resource allocation by the SNDA. 
Indications of performance of the two districts
Our indicators of outcomes related to performance of the water and sanitation sector in 
the two districts concern the 1998-2003 period. We used four criteria to assess 
performance: effectiveness, efficiency, accountability and sustainability. Through these 
indicators, we now relate the types of decentralization in the two districts to performance. 
Our indicators are summarised in Table 3.
Table 3: Criteria for assessing performance
Criteria Indicators
Effectiveness a) changes in coverage of services 
b) reliability of service provision
Efficiency c) changes in loss of water 
d) time taken to repair broken-down facilities 
e) investment per capita in service provision
Accountability f) participation of civic associations in planning, financing and 
management of services
g) frequency of audits 
h) number of times audit reports are discussed at District Assembly 
meetings
Sustainability i) use of local skills in operation and maintenance 
j) proportion of local financing in new investments
Our findings show that Savelugu-Nanton is generally more effective than Tamale (for the 
1998-2003 period), particularly in increasing the coverage and reliability of water to the 
benefit of users (see Table 4). The District-managed Savelugu Water Board, which 
exhibits features of delegation and pluralism, provides longer periods of water supply 
than the deconcentrated Tamale GWCL. The population covered by safe water has also 
seen tremendous growth in Savelugu-Nanton while stagnating in Tamale.
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Table 4: Performance in terms of effectiveness
Indicator Tamale Savelugu-Nanton
Coverage of safe water % change 1998-2003 = 0 % change 1998-2003 = 263
Reliability of flow of water Days a week: 5 (1998) to 2.3 
(2003); increased rationing
Days a week: >1 (1998) to 3 
(2003)
Coverage of safe sanitation % change 1998-2003 = 59 % change 1998-2003 = 42
Compounds with clean 
environment
2003 data only: 31% 2003 data only: 35%
Sources: Authors’ household survey; government records
We also find Savelugu-Nanton to be generally more efficient in the provision of water 
and sanitation, particularly in minimizing water loss and in mobilising both local and 
external resources for investment (see Table 4). Furthermore, our study reveals that 
households with better response time for broken down water points are more likely to be 
using community and district managed systems rather than relying on the GWCL for 
maintenance.
Table 5: Performance in terms of Efficiency
Indicator Tamale Savelugu-Nanton
% water lost: 2003 level 48% 10% 
Repair time: 2003 level 2 days 2.5 days 
Repair time: trend (1998-
2003)
No change Reduced by 64% 
Investment per capita: level About half of national average 
(2001-2003)
2,500 cedis above national 
average (2001-2003)
Sources: Authors’ household survey; government records
Savelugu-Nanton also performs better than Tamale in terms of local accountability
(Table 6). Savelugu-Nanton promotes more participation and better flow of information
in the provision of services. This is essentially due to plural arrangements that have been 
adopted by the district for the provision of services. On the other hand, the Tamale 
approach promotes concentration of information and roles in the government structure, a 
feature that restricts accountability to consumers. In addition, our study shows that 
households who participated in decision-making are more likely to have clean 
compounds. Households not involved in participation are also not likely to have taken
part in reviewing monitoring reports on service provision. The more decentralised 
Savelugu-Nanton has more households who are involved in both decision-making on 
service provision as well as in reviewing monitoring reports
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Table 6: Accountability 
Indicator Tamale Savelugu-Nanton
Mechanisms for participation Announcements through 
electronic media
Community organisations
and electronic media
Frequency of government audit
(1998-2003)
No change: once a year No change: once a year 
Local government's response to 
audit (1998-2003)
No change: only the Mayor and 
Presiding Member of the District 
Assembly have knowledge
No change: only the 
Mayor and Presiding 
Member of the District 
Assembly have 
knowledge
% respondents with knowledge of 
components of price of water
(2003)
37% 48% 
% respondents ever received 
feedback on monitoring (2003)
2% 32% 
Source: Authors’ household survey; government records
Sustainability appears to be a challenge for both Tamale and Savelugu-Nanton 
approaches. The Savelugu-Nanton approach has the strength of using local skills for 
operation and maintenance, unlike Tamale, which relies heavily on skills from outside the 
district. Both cases also rely extensively on foreign support to expand their systems (see 
Table 7). 
 Table 7: Sustainability
Indicator Tamale Savelugu-Nanton
Proportion local contribution to investment 
(2003)
8% 7%
Per capita local (DA+community) 
investment in water and sanitation (cedis 
2001-2003)
1,684 4,301
Use of local skills (2003) Skills mostly from outside 
district
Skills mostly local
Source: Authors’ household survey; government records
Thus, the more plural and decentralised approach to service delivery in Savelugu-Nanton 
appears to be yielding better performance than the case of distributed monopoly or 
concentration of roles in the government structure in Tamale. 
Why Savelugu-Nanton is doing better
We explored through qualitative techniques, including key informants interviews and 
focus group discussions with experts in Ghana as well as users why Savelugu-Nanton is 
doing better in terms of effectiveness, efficiency and accountability; and why it is not 
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lagging behind Tamale in terms of sustainability. We learn that the Savelugu-Nanton
draws its strengths from the following:
a) Roles that local government (the Savelugu-Nanton District Assembly) has 
decided to play in the provision of basic services, particularly leadership,
brokerage and oversight roles. The Savelugu-Nanton District Assembly has in this 
regard developed instruments to pool skills and funds from other actors for the 
provision of basic services.
b) Adoption of manageable scale and technology for providing services within the 
context of available local capacity (capacity available in the area, both in and out 
of government); Savelugu-Nanton utilises diverse technology to provide water –
from shallow to deep wells, wells to piped systems, indoor to public fountains, 
depending on the availability of local skills for management as well as on 
affordability. The adoption of manageable scale and technology has been possible 
because of the brokerage role played by local government and the use of a plural 
approach to service delivery;
c) Service provision that is decentralised to the lowest level of governance on the 
basis of efficiency considerations, which include the ability of the Water Board to 
collect user charges and to promptly repair broken down facilities.
d) Formulation of a clear objective of deepening local accountability of the service 
provider through the design of a water system that is accountable to local 
government and not to a distant national public utility. Through this arrangement, 
the Savelugu Water Board is able to convince consumers to pay more than user 
charges approved by the national Public Utility Regulatory Commission (but less 
than cost of vendor services). Thus, the Savelugu Water Board fully finances its 
operation and maintenance and increasingly, its expansion costs. Accountability 
to local government is also promoted by the adopted scale of service provision.
e) Setting up of well defined plural arrangements for mobilising technical assistance 
and funds from NGOs, private consultants, central government and international 
aid agencies. Local managers indicate that Savelugu-Nanton had no choice but to 
“open up” to a variety of actors, including non state actors to provide safe water 
due to its lack of skills and funds.
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Conclusions
We conclude the paper with policy implications for the design and implementation of 
decentralization reform. The first is the need to ensure that laws establishing service 
delivery agencies and possible partnership arrangements are consistent with the specific 
laws that set out the nature of decentralization reform.
The second policy implication of our study is the need for a conscious implementation 
plan in support of decentralization laws and policies. As noted from the two cases, there 
is likely to be a deviation from the original objective of decentralization if there is no 
conscious adherence to a road-map or sequencing plan. The road-map should include 
details of how and when to implement the various forms of decentralization and should 
be monitored at frequent intervals.
The third policy implication regards the question of appropriate roles by local 
government. While such roles should be determined by the economic characteristics of 
the service in question, we have highlighted the success by local government in playing 
leadership, brokerage and oversight roles in the provision of services, while partnering 
with civil society, central government agencies and private firms to ensure that other 
service delivery roles are performed well. 
Overall, we have learnt about factors that stand out as influencing performance and 
conclude by emphasising the following in the design of central-local relations in the 
provision of basic services in Ghana. The first is to ensure that decentralization reform 
covers all forms (political, fiscal and administrative) in a simultaneous way, so that the 
resulting type of decentralization meets the challenges of service provision at the local 
level. The second is to deepen pluralism in the provision of basic services. We have 
observed that pluralism performs better that distributed monopoly by public utilities. The 
third is to match the preferred scale and technology for providing services with available 
local capacity (capacity available in the area, both in and out of government). Fourthly, 
the decentralisation reforms should deepen local accountability in the provision of basic 
services. Finally, assigning leadership, brokerage and oversight roles for local 
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government in the design of decentralisation reforms is critical for expanding basic 
services. 
Annex 1: Characteristics of households in the sample
Savelugu-Nanton Tamale
No. % No. %
Household head:
Male
Female
Total
231
133
364
63.5
36.5
100
216
186
402
53.7
46.3
100
Mean household size:
Male
Female
Total
7.8
7.7
15.5
6.5
7.1
13.6
Proportion of household 
members that were women
49.6 52.1
Proportion of household 
members that were men
50.4 47.9
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Endnotes
1
 Particularly: Cheema and Rondinelli, eds. (1983); Rondinelli, Nellis and Cheema, (1984); Silverman 
(1992); and Rondinelli (1999). 
2 Other schools emphasise spatial forms of decentralization. We treat this as a geographical manifestation 
of the three main forms. Others also emphasise market decentralization, which basically refers deregulation 
and privatization in the economic literature. See Laryea-Adjei (2006) for a fuller discussion of the subject.
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3
 Caiden (1996) discusses in detail views from the New Public Management school. 
4
 Tamale has a population of approximately 300,000; Savelugu-Nanton’s population is approximately 
100,000 (Ghana Statistical Service, 2001).
5
 Household survey was first used by Laryea-Adjei (2006) for his PhD dissertation, which was successfully 
defended at the Erasmus University, Rotterdam in August 2006.
6
 See Bamberger et al. (2006).
7
 We review partnership arrangements, where they exist, to determine dynamic relationships that pluralism 
may be yielding, informed by Helmsing (2000) and Awortwi (2004).
8
 The following served as a guide: World Bank (2002), Ndegwa (2002), Cohen and Peterson (1999); Parker 
(1995).
9
 The Savelugu-Nanton district was established in 1988, having been carved out of the then West Dagomba 
district, the core of which was also established as the Tamale Municipality.
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